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Abstract: The article discusses liability issues related to the contracting out of
welfare services. It focuses on the possible liability of the private actor and of the
public entity towards the individual (the citizen) for non-performance or mal-
performance of the welfare service. It is argued that since there is no contract
between the individual and the private service provider there may be several
obstacles to a claim against the private service provider based on contract. At the
same time it is a general tort law principle that there is no vicarious liability for
independent contractors, making it difficult also to succeed with a claim against
the public entity based on tort law. Thus, a liability gap seems to exist. However,
the article demonstrates that there are signs in different jurisdictions that solu-
tions are being found in case law to this problem allowing to some extent for the
imposition of some kind of vicarious liability on the public entity. Four different
models are identified. The reasoning behind these models varies but they all have
in common that the public law nature of the service that has been outsourced
somehow plays a role.
I The phenomenon of contracting out
Traditionally, welfare states have seen governments as custodians of public
wealth. Today however, states struggle with budgetary restraints. It is becoming
still harder to find funding for general welfare services such as education, health
care and long term care. This has brought about a push for commercialisation of
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governmental activities.1 Thus, over the past decades, private sector providers of
welfare services have been used to an increasing extent in Europe.2
Private provision of welfare services may be organised in different ways. A
classical way of doing it is by contracting out so that the public entity enters into
a contract with the private party for the provision of the services that would
otherwise have been rendered by the public entity itself.3
It is a basic question whether there are limits as to the extent to which public
tasks can be contracted out at all. According to a widespread understanding,
some tasks are considered ‘core tasks’ of the state. Certain specific areas are often
mentioned as falling into this category4 but, cutting across all areas, the ‘exercise
of public power’ can probably be mentioned as a typical core task of the state.5 At
least in some legal systems, such tasks are also considered non-delegable.6 The
1 H Wollmann/G Marcou, The Provision of Public Services in Europe: Between State, Local
Government and Market (2010) 1; N Seddon, Government Contract: Federal, State and Local (5th
edn 2013) 1.
2 Wollmann/Marcou (fn 1) esp chs 4, 5 and 6. On the current discussions in the UK as to privatisa-
tion of the national health care system, see eg <https://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-net-
work/2015/oct/02/nhs-one-way-road-privatisation>.
3 Another way of turning the private actor into the provider of the public services could be by
allowing the citizens to buy the services they need on the market up to a certain amount, paid for
by the public actor by issuing a ‘voucher’ (Voucher-model). Themost far-reachingmodel for using
private actors for the provision of public services is by privatising the public service provider
(asset privatisation).
4 For instance, French law proceeds from the starting point that certain tasks are the prerogative
of the state (activités régaliennes) such as the handling of external affairs, the defense, the exercise
of justice, taxation and police activity, seeM Gjidara, Les Procédés contractuels entre partenaires
publics: Les contrats entre l’Etat et les collectivités territoriales (2/2011) 48 Zbornik radova
Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu 203, 289.
5 In German law, according to art 22, para 4 of the German Constitution (Bürgerliches Gesetz-
buch, BGB), the exercise of public power in general (hoheitsrechliche Befugnisse) seems to be
regarded a core task of the state.
6 In German law for instance, art 33, para 4 BGB reserves, as a general rule, the exercise of public
power (hoheitsrechlicher Befugnisse) to the public authorities. See also U Stelkens, Amtshaftung
und Regress bei Schädigungen durch Verwaltungshelfer, JuristenZeitung (JZ) 2004, 656 pointing
out that as a general rule decision making cannot be delegated from the public authority to a
private actor. Also in French law, one can observe a distinction between the exercise of public
power (which cannot be delegated) and related activities (which can be delegated), see P Cossal-
ter, Le droit de l’externalisation des activités dans les principaux systèmes européens (2007) 11 ff.
Also in the Nordic countries, there is a basic distinction between acts that represent the exercise of
public power and other acts. In Danish law, acts representing the exercise of public power cannot
be delegated to private parties unless there is a clear statutory basis for doing so, see S Rønsholdt,
Forvaltningsret (4th edn 2013) 197.
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distinction between core tasks of the state and other tasks seems to some extent
to draw on the classical distinction between acts jure imperii (the state acting in
its capacity of the state) and acts jure gestiones (the state acting in its capacity of a
commercial actor).7 The distinction is, however, by no means clear cut and may
be drawn in different ways in different legal systems.
This article focuses on contracting out of welfare services. Moreover, it
focuses on the actual delivery or performance of welfare services as opposed to
decision making about the rights to welfare services. The actual delivery of
welfare services rarely involves the exercise of public power but may nevertheless
be regarded a core task of the state in any legal system.8 Contracting out of the
provision of welfare services is, however, allowed for in many legal systems. This
is also reflected by the fact that European public procurement law encourages
outsourcing of this type of service by clearly establishing the legal framework for
it.9
II Liability issues
A basic concern with regard to contracting out is whether this diminishes ac-
countability. On the one hand, enthusiasts of governmental contracts for out-
sourcing have claimed that there is no negative effect on accountability.10 It has
been argued that accountability has been supplemented by the detailed specifica-
tion of required outputs in the concluded contract.11 On the other hand, several
critics see the consequences of outsourcing through more sceptical lenses claim-
7 However, the distinction does not entirely solve the problem. For instance, not only tasks that
are of a commercial character (such as building a house) can be contracted out.
8 For instance, in German law the provision of education seems to be regarded a public task, see
H Papier, § 839 Haftung bei Amtspflichtverletzung, in: M Habersack (ed), Münchener Kommentar
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 5, Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil III §§ 705–835, Part-
nerschaftsgesellschaftsgesetz, Produkthaftungsgesetz (6th edn 2013) no 168.
9 See Council Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014, art 74 concerning ‘social and other
specific services’ and Annex XIV clarifying that the services referred to in art 74 include such
services as ‘Health, Social and Related Services’, ‘Administrative Social, Educational, Healthcare
and Cultural Services’, ‘Compulsory Social Security Services’, ‘Other Community, Social and
Personal Services’, etc.
10 K Horten-Stephens/C McAliaster, Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out by Public Sector
Agencies (1996).
11 R Mulgan, Government Accountability for Outsourced Services (2006) 2/65 Australian Journal
of Public Administration (AJPA) 48–58.
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ing a definite reduction in the accountability of government.12 This article ana-
lyses the question whether accountability, understood as liability towards the
citizen, is reduced in an outsourcing situation.
A distinction is made between two different situations. In the first situation
(situation A) it is a breach of the contract with the public entity (that is, non-
delivery or malperformance) that causes a loss on the part of the citizen.
An example could be a private party that has contractually undertaken with a
public entity to deliver long term care services in private homes but does not
deliver these services or delivers them in a substandard manner, causing indivi-
duals to suffer either personal injury (for instance if vital medicine is not given) or
purely economic loss in respect of the loss of service. The question is whether the
individual can claim damages for the loss suffered from either the private service
provider or the public entity that has outsourced the task of delivering these
services.
In the second situation (situation B), the loss is caused by an infringement of
ordinary behavioural standards (tort law duties) that exist regardless of the
contract.
An example could be the private service provider of long-term care services
who causes property damage in the home of an individual while performing the
service or steals something from the house.13 Again, the question is whether the
individual can claim damages for the loss suffered from either the private service
provider or the public entity that has outsourced the task of delivering these
services.
This article focuses primarily on the breach of contract situation (situation A)
which is the more complicated one.14
The article analyses first the extent to which public and private entities can
be held liable outside the outsourcing situation for non-delivery or malperfor-
mance of welfare services (Part III below) and contrasts this situation with the
outsourcing situation (Part IV below). As will be shown, contracting out seems to
fundamentally change the position of the citizen.
12 Seddon (fn 1); M Considine, The End of the Line? Accountable Governance in the Age of
Networks, Partnerships, and Joined-Up Services (2005) 1/15 Governance 21–40; R Mulgan, Con-
tracting Out and Accountability (1997) 4/46 AJPA 106–116.
13 Obviously, the two situations cannot always easily be distinguished as the duties arising out
of ordinary tort law obligationsmay be closely connected with the performance of the contract.
14 In situation B, the private service provider will normally be liable according to ordinary tort
law rules, securing an avenue of redress for the citizen.
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III Liability of public and private entities for the
provision of welfare services in general
A Public authority liability for the provision of welfare services
Public authority liability is seen as a complicated topic in most jurisdictions and
legal solutions vary.15 Historically, it has been the starting point in many legal
systems, that public authority liability was not recognised at all. However, gradu-
ally, public authority liability became recognised as a possibility, to differing
extents, in different national legal systems.16 Today, different national legal sys-
tems represent a variety of alternative views on public authority liability.17 Accord-
ing to one model, represented by the US, the principle of immunity (formally) still
plays a central role, making it the general rule that public authorities cannot be
held liable under tort law unless special provisions provide a basis for liability by
waiving governmental immunity.18 The other extreme may be said to be repre-
sented by jurisdictions such as Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the UK,19 in
principle applying ordinary tort law rules to public authorities. Intermediate
15 See in general K Oliphant (ed), The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective
(2016); O Dörr (ed), Staatshaftung in Europa, Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014); C van Dam,
European Tort Law (2nd edn 2013) 18.
16 For historical developments along these lines in different national legal systems, see for
England and Wales: K Oliphant, The Liability of Public Authorities in England and Wales, in:
idem, The Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (2016) 129 f, for France: D
Fairgrieve/F Lichère, The Liability of Public Authorities in France, in: K Oliphant (ed), The Liability
of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (2016) 156 f and for Norway: B Askeland, The
Liability of Public Authorities in Norway, in: K Oliphant (ed), The Liability of Public Authorities in
Comparative Perspective (2016) 332 f. See also for Germany: O Dörr, § 5 Deutschland, in: O Dörr
(ed), Staatshaftung in Europa, Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014) 123, for Belgium: C van
Schoubroeck, § 3 Belgium, in: O Dörr (ed), Staatshaftung in Europa, Nationales und Unionsrecht
(2014) 63 and for Spain:OMir, § 22 Spain, in: O Dörr (ed), Staatshaftung in Europa, Nationales und
Unionsrecht (2014) 703.
17 In some legal systems public authority liability is not covered by tort law but by administrative
law under which separate rules to deal with liability questions have been developed. For instance,
this is the case in French lawwhere public authority liability is governed by droit administratif, see
van Dam (fn 15) 531 f. However, the administrative law rules on liability have been developed in
part with inspiration from tort law, see further ibid at 534.
18 See MD Green, The Liability of Public Authorities in The United States, in: K Oliphant, The
Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (2016) 539 f, describing the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) introduced in 1946 and waving immunity at federal level. Similar acts have
been introduced at state level.
19 See van Schoubroeck (fn 16) 63.
82 Vibe Ulfbeck und Marta Andrecka
Brought to you by | The Royal Library (Det Kongelige Bibliotek) - National Library of Denmark / Copenhagen University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/17/17 1:04 PM
positions exist in some legal systems, sometimes to a certain extent by making a
distinction between negligence and gross negligence,20 and at other times by
distinguishing between situations in which the public entity acts in its capacity of
a public authority (acts jure imperii) and situations in which it acts in its capacity
of a private (commercial) actor (acts iure gestiones). The general line of thought
regarding the latter being that ordinary tort law principles apply to the extent that
the public entity acts in its capacity as a commercial actor, whereas the state may
be subject to special liability rules if it acts in its capacity as a state.21
To the extent that welfare services, such as health care, long term care
services and child care, are to be provided by a public entity, and the service is
not performed or is performed in a substandard manner, it will often be possible
to hold the public entity liable towards the citizen for non-performance according
to tort law rules. Thus, if a public entity does not live up to its statutory obliga-
tions to deliver a particular service to a citizen and this is due to the negligence on
the part of an employee of the public entity, then the citizen may be able to bring
an action in tort against the public entity.22 In some legal systems, the possibilities
of bringing such an action may be limited by a general rule barring tort law claims
for purely economic loss,23 whereas in other legal systems this rule does not
20 In French law, for instance, the state in some cases is only subject to liability in cases of gross
negligence. This milder liability used to apply in a broad range of situations but today it is limited
to supervisory tasks of the state, see N Marsch, § 7 Frankreich, in: O Dörr (ed), Staatshaftung in
Europa, Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014) 207 f.
21 Interestingly, these special rules seem to at times render the liability milder, the US principle
of immunity being the clearest example of this, whereas at other times turn it into a stricter
liability, as exemplified by the rule in ch 3, § k2 in the Swedish Damages Act (Skadeståndslagen)
according to which there is public authority liability for acts that are acts de jure imperii
(myndighetsutövning). The rule implies an extension of liability to also cover cases of purely
economic loss. It is discussed whether the rule also entails strict liability, see T Bull, § 18 Sweden,
in: O Dörr, Staatshaftung in Europa, Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014) 576 f. As will be explained
below, there are also examples in Polish law and French law of stricter liability in cases concern-
ing the exercise of public authority.
22 In both Denmark and Norway such cases are quite common. Recently, quite a few cases have
concerned parents suing for damages for insufficient school service in one form or the other, see
further V Ulfbeck, Kommunalt erstatningsansvar for mangelfuld specialundervisning (2010) 9/92
Juristen 266 ff. The type of case has also been brought in France, see Marsch (fn 20) 205. It may
also be possible to bring such suits in the UK on the basis of breach of a statutory duty but such
claims are subject to the requirement that there must be a parliamentary intent to confer a civil
right of action, seeOliphant (fn 16) 137, noting that courts are reluctant to find such an intent when
the defendant is a public authority. See also van Dam (fn 15) 547.
23 This is the case in English law, see eg van Dam (fn 15) 213. See also Principles of European Tort
Law (PETL) art 2:202 (4), reflecting the reluctance in several European legal systems to award
damages for purely economic loss in tort.
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apply,24 or special provisions provide for liability for purely economic loss with
regard to public authority liability.25 The liability will often be a mild liability in
the sense that limited financial resources may be an excuse that can exempt the
public authority from liability.26
B Private actor liability for the provision of welfare services
When private service providers of welfare services, such as private schools and
private hospitals, are licensed or otherwise certified to provide services to indivi-
duals, they often do this on the basis of a contract with the individual. If the
service is not performed or is badly performed, the individual can sue the private
party on the basis of this contract. In principle, the contract determines the basis
of liability but the obligation under the contract to deliver welfare services will
often be a ‘reasonable care’ obligation or a ‘best effort’ obligation. Since the
private actors involved are most often professional parties, the best effort stan-
dard may be a professional liability standard.27 This means that, as a general rule,
the private service provider may be subject to a rather strict liability regime, also
reflecting the fact that the private service provider is being paid to deliver its
services. Certainly, a private service provider will not be able avoid liability by
pleading ‘limited resources’. Whereas the public service provider is under a
statutory duty to deliver services, the private party has voluntarily entered into a
24 This is the case in French law, see eg van Dam (fn 15) 210. The same is true of Danish law, and
Norwegian law, see for instance, V Ulfbeck, Modern Tort Law and Direct Claims under the
Scandinavian Insurance Acts (2001) 41 Scandinavian Studies in Law (Sc St L) 523.
25 See eg the Swedish Damages Act (Skadeståndslagen) ch 3, § 2 allowing for tort law actions to
be brought against public authorities also in cases of pure economic loss. Also in German law,
liability based on § 839 BGB covers claims for purely economic loss, see van Dam (fn 15) 542 with
reference to the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesrichtshof, BGH) 12.6.1986 – III ZR 146/85,
Neue JuristischeWochenschrift (NJW) 1987, 585–588.
26 See for French law:Marsch (fn 20) 205 and for Danish law: VUlfbeck, § 4 Dänemark, in: O Dörr
(ed), Staatshaftung in Europa, Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014) 104. A similar line of thought is
reflected in the English concept of ‘justiciability’ and the distinction between policy issues and
operational issues, seeOliphant (fn 16) 140 and van Dam (fn 15) 548 f.
27 In English law, the ‘reasonable care’ standard would apply to the private actor. In the US, on
the other hand, the private service provider will often be subject to a professional liability
standard. For a report on liability costs in the long term care sector in the US, see <http://www.
aon.com/risk-services/thought-leadership/report-2015-long-term-care.jsp>. As an example of
professional liability insurance options in the childcare sector in the US, see <https://www.
trustedchoice.com/small-business-insurance/children-pet/daycare/op>. For liability insurance
options for private and charter schools in the UK, see eg <http://www.charterschoolcover.com/>.
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contract to this end and could have chosen not do so if resources were a
problem.28
C Summing up and perspectives
As described above, when it comes to the delivery of welfare services, the citizen
will often have a choice between a public and a private service provider. Whereas
the public service provider may be subject to a milder liability regime than the
private service provider, both the public and the private service provider will be
subject to some form of liability. As will be shown in the following, contracting
out seems to fundamentally change this premise.
IV Liability in the outsourcing situation
A Liability of the private service provider
1 General
If a private actor has undertaken to deliver welfare services to individuals on the
basis of a contract with a public entity, the private actor functions as a ‘subcon-
tractor’ of the public entity. This means there will be no contractual relationship
between the private party and the individual. This may complicate matters with
regard to the liability of the private service provider towards the individual. For
instance, if a public school has contracted out the task of looking after the
children during recess to a private actor and one of the pupils suffers personal
injury due to the neglect of the private actor, the question may arise whether the
private actor could be held liable towards the pupil.
2 Tort law approach
Obviously, if the private service provider infringes ordinary behavioural require-
ments (situation B) liability will most often follow from ordinary tort law rules.
28 It goes without saying that the private service provider would also be liable according to
ordinary tort law principles for causing harm by the infringement of ordinary behavioural
standards (situation B).
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For instance, in the example above, if the private guard negligently pushes or hits
a child during recess, causing personal injury, the guard would most often be
liable according to tort law principles.29
The problem is more complicated if the case concerns a situation in which the
private service provider has not lived up to its obligations under the contract
(situation A). For instance, in the example given above, this would be the case if
the private guard did not watch over the children and did not prevent a child from
getting beaten up by another child. As a general rule there is no liability for
omissions in tort law30 and consequently the obligation to take care of the
children seems to arise only from the contract to which the pupil is not a party.
Legal systems have responded differently to this problem.
In German law, it has been argued that a private party who enters into a
contract like this undertakes not only a contractual duty towards the contracting
party but also a tort law duty of care towards third parties.31 In English law, the
doctrine of assumption of responsibility may be relevant, in particular the part of
the doctrine which concerns the assumption of responsibility for another’s wel-
fare.32 The application of tort law will in some legal systems be limited to cases
concerning property damage or personal injury, whereas claims for the recovery
of purely economic loss in these systems as a general rule fall outside the scope of
29 Specific rules may lead to the result that the private actor cannot be held liable despite a
negligent act. In German law, for instance, it has recently been held that the private party
(contractor) carrying out tasks for the police with regard to securing safety during the winter,
cannot be held (directly) liable towards an injured third party, since the task is regarded a task
that was hoheitlich. For this reason, liability rested on the state rather than on the private party
according to § 839 BGB, see BGH 9.10.2014 – III ZR 68/14, NJW 2014, 3580–3582.
30 See art 4:103 PETL on the duty to protect others (only) in special situations.
31 See for instance van Dam (fn 15) 252. See also P Rott, Case Studies, in: L Bergkamp/M Faure/M
Hinteregger/N Philipsen (eds), Civil Liability in Europe for Terrorism-Related Risk (2015) 162, with
reference to BGH 13.3.1962 – VI ZR 142/61, NJW 1962, 959 f, BGH 12.6.1990 – VI ZR 273/89, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift – Rechtsprechungsreport: Zivilrecht (NJW-RR) 1990, 1245 f and Kam-
mergericht Berlin (KG) 20.11.1998 – 25 U 8244/97, NJW-RR 2000, 242–244. However, liability
cannot be imposed on the private party if the task is hoheitlich, see BGH 9.10.2014 – III ZR 68/14,
NJW 2014, 3580–3582. In French law it may be possible to reach the same result as it has been
acknowledged by the courts that a breach of contract can be invoked as a tortious delict by third
parties to whom such a breach caused a loss, see F G’sell, Case Studies, in: L Bergkamp/M Faure/
M Hinteregger/N Philipsen (eds), Civil Liability in Europe for Terrorism-Related Risk (2015) 161
with reference to Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière (Cass Ass plén), 6 October 2006, 05–
13.255, Bulletin des arrêts de la cour de cassation (Bull) Ass plén no 9, 23.
32 See for instance van Dam (fn 15) 106 f, 251 and further below on the Woodland case under
Sec IVB2b above.
86 Vibe Ulfbeck und Marta Andrecka
Brought to you by | The Royal Library (Det Kongelige Bibliotek) - National Library of Denmark / Copenhagen University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/17/17 1:04 PM
tort law.33 In these legal systems tort law cannot be used as a basis for claiming
damages for the economic loss suffered in cases where the social service simply
has not been delivered but no physical loss has been caused.
3 Contract law approach
The bar to recovery in tort law stemming from the doctrine of purely economic
loss may be overcome by relying not on tort law but on contract law by invoking
the concept of third party beneficiary law. The theory of the third party beneficiary
is an exemption from the principle of privity of contract, where a third party who
is not a party to the contract itself can, under certain circumstances, claim the
benefit of the contract. In order for a contract to be classified as a third party
beneficiary contract it must contain a provision that can be interpreted to the
effect that B (here: the private service provider) towards his contractual partner A
(here: the public entity) undertakes an obligation to do something that is bene-
ficial to C (here: the citizen). The concept of the third party beneficiary contract is
recognised in several jurisdictions.34 One of the requirements that must be
fulfilled is that the contractual parties must intend to confer a right on the third
party. Quite often contracts for the outsourcing of tasks from the public sector to
private actors will not live up to this requirement.35 However, Finnish law
provides an interesting example of an (perhaps half-hearted) attempt to use third
party beneficiary law to provide the citizen with a remedy against the private
service provider for lack of fulfilment of its contractual obligations.
33 As explained above, examples of such legal systems include the English legal system and the
German legal system, although in English law it is possible to claim damages for purely economic
loss if the action is based on assumption of liability, see for instance van Dam (fn 15) 213.
34 See eg for German law: § 328 BGB, French law: art 1121 Code civil (CC), English law: Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and US law: The Restatement Second § 302 ff. For US law, see
further D Summers, Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1982) 4/
67 Cornell Law Review (CLR) 880 ff. The concept is also recognised in Scandinavia, see T Iversen,
Tredjemandsaftaler (1994) 107 Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap (Journal of Legal Science TFR) 14–116.
The concept of the third party contract is also recognised in what could be called ‘general
international contract law’ as reflected in UNIDROIT Principles arts 5.2.1.–5.2.6, PECL art 6:110,
CESL art 78 and DCFR art 9:301.
35 For an examination of the possible third party effects of the Danish standard contracts used
for contracting out of long term care services, see V Ulfbeck, Ansvar over for borgeren når private
aktører leverer velfærdsydelser (2016) 2/98 Juristen 86 ff reaching the conclusion that no such
third party effects can be found in the contracts.
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In 2014 the Finnish Ministry of Finances in its General Terms of Public
Procurement in Service Contracts formally recognised that service users, the per-
sons using the outsourced services, have independent rights to compensation for
damages arising from the private service provider’s breach of the contract.36 This
provision was introduced in order to clarify the service provider’s liability for
damages and the procedures related to the processing of the claim for compensa-
tion between the customer and the service provider. The aim is that rather than
the customer (government) acting as intermediary in the process, the service
provider (private service supplier) will handle the matter directly with the user of
the service.37
Sections 17.1 and 17.2 read as follows38
The service provider is obliged to compensate damage it caused to the service user through
acting in violation of the procurement contract between the customer and the service
provider.39 If the service provider is presented with a claim for compensation, the service
provider will notify the customer about the claim for compensation without delay. The
service provider will strive to agree on the amount of compensation with the party claiming
compensation. If an agreement is reached about the amount of compensation, the private
service provider will pay the compensation directly to the service user and notify the
customer without delay about the payment made.40 Should the service provider find that it
is not liable for damages in the matter or no agreement can be reached concerning the
amount of compensation, the service provider must inform the service user and the custo-
mer about this, with justification, in writing within a reasonable time of the arrival of the
claim for compensation.
The formulation of the clauses illustrates some of the difficulties related to using
the third party beneficiary theory as a solution to the problem. Thus, the model is
based on the idea of negotiations between the parties and in reality the clause
does not grant the citizen any right against the private actor. Presumably, the
clauses simply reflect the fact that the parties to the contract (the public entity
and the service provider) in reality have no incentives to grant the citizen such a
right.
36 Finnish Ministry of Finances, General Terms of Public Procurement in Service Contracts 2014,
available at: <http://vm.fi/documents/10623/307565/JYSE+2014+services/920004d3-fbfd-4e82-b
4ce-fccdf6e9dbc5>, sec 17.
37 Ibid, secs 17.2 and 17.3.
38 Ibid, sec 17.2.
39 Ibid, sec 17.1.
40 Ibid, sec 17.2.
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4 Summing up and perspectives
To sum up, on the basis of the above it can be concluded that raising a claim
against the private actor in an outsourcing situation may be quite complicated. In
some situations, tort law may provide a remedy, but in some legal systems the
remedy will be limited so as not to include cases of purely economic loss. Third
party beneficiary law will only provide the citizen with a remedy to the extent that
this is the intention of the parties to the contract, which will not always be the
case. Even if a remedy exists in either tort law or contract law, it may not be
possible to enforce the claim. For example, the private service provider may have
gone bankrupt or for other reasons no longer exist. This raises the question
whether the public entity that has contracted out the task can be held liable for
the inadequate performance of the private party.
B Liability of the public service provider when contracting out
1 General
Most often, there is no specific statutory regulation around the question of the
liability of the public entity in the outsourcing situation. Even if a statute indicates
that the public entity is still ‘responsible’ or ‘accountable’ when outsourcing, this
does not necessarily answer the question whether the public entity is liable if the
private service provider causes a loss.41 To the contrary, in tort law it is normally a
requirement for imposing liability that it is possible to prove fault on the part of
the tortfeasor. Most often, this will not be possible in the outsourcing situation.
Thus, most often it will not be possible to prove that the public party has
negligently chosen an incompetent subcontractor (culpa in eligendo), has ne-
glected a duty to supervise the private party or has been negligent in choosing to
outsource in the first place. Consequently, the question arises whether the public
entity (the contractor) could be held vicariously liable for the private party as an
independent contractor.
41 See Sec I above on the concepts of ‘responsibility’ and ‘accountability’. When the provision of
welfare services is contracted out to private parties, most often there will be no contract (private or
public) between the public entity and the individual, but to the extent that such a contract does
exist this contract could form a basis for the claim. In the following it is assumed that no such
contract exists.
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In tort law, it is the general rule in most jurisdictions42 that there is no
vicarious liability for independent contractors. The policy consideration under-
lying this rule is that the employer will not be in a position to control and instruct
the independent contractor. Thus, if the negligent act of the independent contrac-
tor causes damage to a third party, the contractor will not be subject to vicarious
liability. In contract, by contrast, the position is the opposite. If a person (the
employer) who is under a contractual duty to deliver a service (or goods) to
someone else (the contractual partner) chooses to outsource the task of delivering
the service to a subcontractor who fails to do so, then the contractor will be
vicariously liable if the negligent act of the subcontractor causes a breach of the
contract with the contractual partner.43 The policy reason underlying this rule is
that the employer should not be able to release himself from his contractual
obligation towards the contractual partner by delegating the performance of the
contract to someone else. To use the English term, the duty to perform the
contract towards the contractual partner can be categorised as a ‘non-delegable’
duty.44
If these basic private law principles are applied in the outsourcing situation,
the result is that the public entity will not be liable for the negligence on the part
of the private service provider. Since there is no contractual relationship between
the public entity and the citizen, the tort law rule rather than the contract law rule
would apply. This leads to no liability on the part of the public entity. Not least,
seen in the light of the fact that – as described above – it may also be difficult to
hold the private party liable, this result may not seem very satisfactory.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that different models for holding the
public entity liable have been developed in different legal systems.
It might be argued that, also with regard to vicarious liability of the public
entity, a distinction should be made between situations in which the private
service provider has only breached the contract with the public entity (situation A)
and situations in which the private service provider has caused damage by infring-
ing ordinary behavioural standards (situation B). However, as will be shown this
42 See S Galand-Carval, Comparative Report on Liability for Damage Caused by Others, in: J Spier
(ed), Unification of Tort Law: Liability for Damage Caused by Others (2003) 290, 306 f.
43 This principle is generally acknowledged in European law, see Galand-Carval (fn 42) 290,
306 f.
44 ‘Non-delegable’ does not mean that the task cannot in fact be delegated but that the entity
remains liable for the acts of the party to whom it has delegated the task. The contractual rule,
imposing vicarious liability for independent contractors, will most often be the relevant rule if the
case concerns private as opposed to public outsourcing since the task that is outsourced by a
private party to a subcontractor will most often be based on a contract between the private party
and another private party.
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distinction is less clear in the existing models for imposing vicarious liability on
the public entity.
2 Different models for imposing vicarious liability on the public entity
a Model 1: The private service provider is regarded an integrated part of the
public entity
In some legal systems it is recognised that, although it is the general rule that
there is no vicarious liability for independent contractors, the public entity could
still become liable if the private service provider must be regarded as an inte-
grated part of the public entity.
In German law this line of thought is represented with regard to the inter-
pretation of § 839 sec 1 BGB, which is the basic rule regulating public authority
liability.45 According to this provision, liability is imposed on the ‘public official’
(Beamter) for intentional and negligent acts, but the liability is ‘transferred’ to the
state on the basis of art 34 Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG).46 Moreover, the liability
of the public official is under certain circumstances extinguished if the public
official has only acted negligently. A central question with regard to the under-
standing of this provision is the concept of the ‘public official’. In this regard, it
has been recognised for a long time that independent contractors that are
employed to carry out public tasks may – in the circumstances – be regarded as
‘public officials’ in the sense of § 839 sec 1 BGB.47 One of the central criteria for
determining whether this is the case is the extent to which the independent
contractor can make decisions of its own and to what extent the private actor
simply just functions as a ‘tool’ (Werkzeug) of the public entity.48
Likewise, under Spanish law it seems to be accepted that:49
45 § 839 sec 1 BGB reads: ‘(1) If an official intentionally or negligently breaches the official duty
incumbent upon him in relation to a third party, then he must compensate the third party for
damage arising from this. If the official is only responsible because of negligence, then he may
only be held liable if the injured person is not able to obtain compensation in another way’ (semi-
official translation of theMinistry of Justice).
46 Art 34 para 4 reads: ‘The exercise of sovereign authority on a regular basis shall, as a rule, be
entrusted to members of the public service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty
defined by public law’ (Semi-official translation of theMinistry of Justice).
47 Münchkomm Papier (fn 8) no 17.
48 Münchkomm Papier (fn 8) no 17, BGH 21.1.1993 – III ZR 189/91, NJW 1993, 1258–1260 and
<https://www.vrsdigital.de/content/link/128_002>, NJW 2014, 3580–3582. In cases that involve
administrative acts that in a burdensome way interfere with the life of the citizen (Eingriffs-
verwaltung) it is assumed that the state is liable on the basis of art 34 GG, regardless of the extent
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when the cooperation between the public administration and the private enterprise is
organized in such way that the private body acts under the control and under the orders of
the public administration, this leads to imposing liability on the state in the same manner as
if an authentic civil servant had acted.
The US doctrine on ‘state acts’ seems to reflect the same idea. According to this
doctrine it is also decisive to what extent the private actor who is carrying out
public tasks is in reality instructed by the government on how to perform the task
or has the right to decide for itself.50
Thus, in jurisdictions accepting this theory, to the extent that welfare services
are provided under contracts with private service providers that in reality leave
them little choice as to how the service is to be carried out, there may be a case for
the vicarious liability of the state.51
This liability model does not require a distinction between situations in which
the private actor has caused a loss to the citizen by breaching the contract with
the public entity (situation B) and situations where the loss has been caused to
the citizen because the private service provider has infringed general behavioural
standards (situation B). Vicarious liability – it appears – may be imposed in both
situations.
b Model 2: Analogy from contract law
Closely related to model 1 is model 2 which is based on an analogy from contract
law. A recent English case provides a very good example of this. Thus, in Wood-
land,52 where the question of the vicarious liability of a public entity was relevant,
the court accepted that there could be no deviation from the general tort law rule
that there can be no vicarious liability for independent contractors but achieved
to which the private service provider has been able to act independently, see Münchkomm Papier
(fn 8) no 18.
49 See P del Olmo, Case Studies, in: L Bergkamp/M Faure/M Hinteregger/N Phillipsen (eds), Civil
Liability in Europe for Terrorism-Related Risk (2015) 176, 159.
50 See eg GE Metzger, Privatization as Delegation (2003) 6/103 Columbia Law Review (Colum L
Rev) 1429–1432 explaining how the state action doctrine as it is interpreted by the courts creates
‘perverse’ incentives for the public entity to ‘police private providers and regulators from afar’,
since toomuch control may lead to liability for the public entity for the acts of the private actor.
51 Danish contracts for the outsourcing of long term care services could perhaps bementioned as
an example of this, see O Hansen, Strategier for længerevarende kontrakter om udlicitering af
kommunal service (2016) 2/98 Juristen 53 f making the point that the Danish standard contracts
apply amodel that give full control to the public entity.
52 Woodland v Essex Country Council [2013] United KingdomSupreme Court (UKSC) 66.
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the same result by imposing liability on the public entity for its breach of a non-
delegable duty with reference to the parallel in contract law.
The case concerned a state school which had contracted out the provision of
swimming lessons to a private party. Due to negligence on the part of an employee
(a lifeguard) of the private party in carrying out this task, a pupil suffered personal
injury and the question arose whether the state school could be held liable. The
court found that this was the case. Thus, the court found that the school had been
subject to a non-delegable duty existing where pursuant to an ‘antecedent rela-
tionship’ between the parties. Lord Sumption stated:53
the defendant is assuming a liability analogous to that assumed by a person who contracts
to do work carefully...The analogy with public services is often close, especially in the
domain of hospital treatment in the National Health Service or education at a local educa-
tion authority school, where only the absence of consideration distinguishes them from the
private hospital or the fee-paying school performing the same functions under contract.
Lord Sumption further added that, as fee-paying schools’ responsibilities ‘are
already non-delegable because they are contractual’ there was ‘in this particular
context...no rational reason why the mere absence of consideration should lead
to an entirely different result when comparable services are provided by a public
authority.’54
This reasoning is very interesting.
It questions the appropriateness of applying the tort law rule of no vicarious
liability in a situation where the employer – admittedly – is under no contractual
obligation to perform towards a contractual partner, but is under a statutory
obligation to perform towards the citizen. Implicit in this argument is the thought
that, although there is no contractual relationship between the employer and the
employee, the employer does have (legislatively based) performance obligations
towards the citizen (the injured party), making the relationship more comparable
to the contractual situation than to the tort law situation in which the injured
party is an innocent third party with no relationship to the employer. When it is
not possible to delegate a contractual obligation, it should also not be possible to
delegate an obligation imposed by law, seems to be the line of thought.55
53 Ibid, para 7.
54 Ibid, para 25(5).
55 The reasoning in Woodland has been criticised in the following way: ‘There are many
situations where liability is quite unproblematic in contract...while controversial in tort. Many
have argued for the expansion of tort liability in these areas, for various reasons. But few before
Woodland passed from the trite observation that, had a contract existed between the parties, the
defendant would have been liable to assert liability and that therefore there must be liability in
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This line of thought also seems to play a role in German law. Thus, in legal
theory the parallel to § 278 sec 1 BGB has been made.56 According to this provision
a contracting party is liable for its subcontractors towards its own contractual
partner for the non-performance of the contract. It has been argued that, in an
outsourcing situation, the relationship between the public entity and the citizen
is comparable to the relationship between the contracting parties in a subcon-
tracting situation.57 Also the contractual terminology ‘performance helper’ (Er-
füllungsgehilfe) is used to describe the role of private service providers performing
public tasks.58
In Scandinavian legal theory too, it has been argued that vicarious liability of
the public entity should be imposed on the basis of an analogy from contract
law.59
Thus, in legal systems accepting the analogy from contract law, it may be
possible to argue that the public entity which has outsourced the provision of
welfare services to a private party should be vicariously liable for non-perfor-
mance or mal-performance of this obligation.
If this line of reasoning is followed it could be argued that a distinction
should indeed be made between situations in which the private actor has caused
a loss to the citizen by breaching the contract with the public entity (situation A)
and situations where the loss has been caused to the citizen because the private
service provider has infringed general behavioural standards (situation B). In the
first situation, the public entity should be held vicariously liable on the basis of
an analogy from contract law, whereas the public entity should not be held
vicariously liable in the second situation, since contract law would not provide
for liability in this situation.60
tort. Such reasoning seems dubious’, see J Morgan, Liability for Independent Contractors in
Contract and Tort (2015) 1/74 Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 111.
56 Münchkomm Papier (fn 8) no 18, Stelkens, JZ 2004, 656, 658with references.
57 Stelkens, JZ 2004, 656, 658with references.
58 See eg the recent decision BGH 9.10.2014 – III ZR 68/14, NJW 2014, 3580–3582. It could also be
considered whether the German concept of a ‘Sonderverbindung’ between the public entity and
the individual could trigger liability under such rules § 278 BGB and § 1313a Austrian Civil Code
(ABGB).
59 See for Swedish law J Kleinemann, De offentliga rättsubjektens skadeståndsansvar- offentl-
igrättslig regelering med privaträttslig metod (1991–1992) Jurisdisk Tidskrift (JT) 63, 93 and for
Danish law, seeUlfbeck (2016) 2/98 Juristen 86 ff, 90.
60 See Stelkens, JZ 2004, 656, 659 making this distinction and also for Danish law Ulfbeck (2016)
2/98 Juristen 90, 94.
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c Model 3: Distinction between tasks jure imperii and jure gestiones
A third model places emphasis on the extent to which the task that is being
outsourced is a task that would have been characterised as a task de jure imperii
and thereby of a public law nature, rather than an act de jure gestiones and
thereby of a private law nature.61 The fact that an act is of a public law nature is
sometimes used as a justification that the public entity should be held vicariously
liable for the acts of the private service provider. A clear example of this is
provided by Polish law. According to the Polish Civil Code (Kodeks cywilny)
art 417 § 2, the public entity which has contracted out tasks that are ‘public
authority tasks’ and the private service provider taking on these tasks are jointly
liable for losses.62 Although broadly formulated, a distinction between acts jure
imperii and acts jure gestiones with regard to this article was introduced by the
Constitutional Court in a ruling in 2001.63 Thus, if the task is of a more commercial
character (in the sphere of the dominum) the ordinary rules of tort law apply,
which means that as a general rule the state will not be liable for the acts of the
private service provider. Interestingly, in a case from 200664 it was held that
services provided by a state hospital (for MRSA infection) was not a manifestation
of the state’s actions in the sphere of the imperium but only in the sphere of
dominum.
This distinction (or a similar one) may also be relevant in French law. Thus,
in a recent case it was held by the Conseil d’Etat that the state could be held liable
for the acts of a private contractor carrying out (practical) police tasks.65
In this case, an administrative court had decided that cattle belonging to farmer (F) was to
be slain and the farm and the equipment at the farm to be disinfected. The task of disinfect-
ing was contracted out by the police to a private party. In carrying out the task, the private
actor negligently caused property damage. F sued the state claiming damages for his loss
and arguing that the state should be held liable for the acts of the private party. The Conseil
d’Etat affirmed the decision handed down by the appellate court of Lyon that the state was
liable. The (formal) reason given for this was that when police powers are contracted out
they must be exercised under the control and the responsibility of the administration.
61 How to draw the distinction between these categories is debated inmost jurisdictions.
62 Art 417 § 2 reads as follows: ‘If tasks of a public authority have been commissioned under an
agreement to a local government unit or other legal entity, then the commissioning entity and the
commissioned entity are jointly and severally liable for damage caused’. See further T Milej, § 15
Polen, in: O Dörr (ed), Staatshaftung in Europa: Nationales und Unionsrecht (2014) 470 f. See also
E Bagińskay, The Liability of Public Authorities in Poland, in: K Oliphant (ed), The Liability of
Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (2016) 351, 357 f.
63 Judgment of 12 April 2001.
64 Case of 12 October 2006 (ACa 838/706).
65 CE 10/10/2011.
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By its decision, the Conseil d’Etat imposed liability on the state for the acts of the
private actor. The reason given for this in the decision is the fact that the private
actor carrying out police tasks is – or must be – under the control of the state.
However, in a commentary to the case it has been argued that the decision in
reality and implicitly reflects the fact that the task carried out by the private party
was an act régalienne (act jure imperii) and that this was the real reason why
vicarious liability was imposed.66
The same tendency can be seen in German law where it has been established
in case law that the more a task has the character of reflecting the exercise of
sovereign power (hoheitlicher Charakter), the stronger the argument for regarding
the private service provider carrying out this task as part of the public administra-
tion under § 839 sec 1 BGB, whereby the public entity will be liable.67 As in Polish
law, it seems also in German law to be the general rule that hospital services are
not to be regarded as a reflection of the exercise of sovereign power.68
In jurisdictions such as Poland that connect the question of the vicarious
liability of the state with the question whether the service provided reflects the
exercise of public authority, it will be decisive whether the particular welfare
service that has been provided can be regarded as a reflection of the exercise of
sovereign power or not. Hospital services have been held to fall outside the scope
of this concept. However, other welfare services may be regarded differently.69
This liability model does not seem to require a distinction between situations
A and B.
d Model 4: Combination model
Sometimes all of the models above are combined. German law provides an
example of this. Thus in the case from 1993,70 the Federal Court of Justice (Bundes-
gerichtshof, BGH) pronounced the following:71
66 See Fallait Pas Faire du Droit, La reference du droit en ligne, ‘Délégation contractuelle d’une
activité materielle de police et responsabilité de l’Etat (CE 10/10/2011, Ministre de l’alimentation,
de l’agriculture et de la pêche)’.
67 See BGH 21.1.1993 – III ZR 189/91, NJW 1993, 1258–1260 and the recent decision in BGH 9.10.20
14 – III ZR 68/14, NJW 2014, 3580–3582.
68 Münchkomm Papier (fn 8) nos 165–167, whereas it is debated how to categorise the task of
keeping the roads in a proper condition, see ibid at nos 177–184.
69 For instance, in German law the provision of education seems to be regarded an exercise of
public authority, seeMünchkomm Papier (fn 8) no 168.
70 BGH 21.1.1993 – III ZR 189/91, NJW 1993, 1258–1260.
71 ‘Je stärker der hoheitliche Charakter der Aufgabe in den Vordergrund tritt, je enger die
Verbindung zwischen der übertragenen Tätigkeit und der von der öffentlichen Hand zu erfüllen-
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The stronger the public authority character of the task, the closer the connection between
the transferred task and the public authority task which must be fulfilled by the public
entity, and the more limited the space for decision making by the independent contractor,
the more compelling it becomes to reach the conclusion that the independent contractor
should be regarded as being part of the public administration with regard to liability issues.
As will be apparent, this ‘guideline’ combines all three of the above criteria. First,
the more limited the space for decision making on the part of the private party,
the stronger the case for vicarious liability. This reflects model 1, according to
which the extent to which the private actor is in fact controlled by the public
entity is central. Second, the closer the connection between the transferred task
and the public authority task which must be fulfilled by the public entity, the
stronger the case for vicarious liability. This reflects model 2, according to which
an analogy should be made to the basic principle of vicarious liability in contract
law. This principle also rests on the idea that if someone, who is under a
contractual obligation to somebody else, choses to subcontract the exact same
obligation to a third party, then the subcontracting party remains liable for non-
performance or mal-performance to its contractual partner. Third, it is empha-
sised that the character of the task matters. The more it involves the exercise of
public authority, the stronger the case for vicarious liability. This reflects model 3,
according to which the distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure ges-
tiones is decisive.
It is an open question whether the combination model requires a distinction
between situations A and B.
3 Summing up and perspectives
As will be apparent from the above, the question of the possible vicarious liability
of the public entity in an outsourcing situation has been approached from
different angles in different jurisdictions. It is a common feature that as a general
rule there is no vicarious liability for an independent contractor and for that
reason it is difficult to establish liability. At the same time, it is also a common
feature that the public law nature of the task is in one way or another used as an
argument in favour of adopting an exception to the general rule so as to be able to
impose vicarious liability. In model 1, the basic idea is that the private actor
den hoheitlichen Aufgabe und je begrenzter der Entscheidungsspielraum des Privaten ist, desto
näher liegt es, ihn als Beamten im haftungsrechtlichen Sinne anzusehen’. This passage was also
quoted in the recent decision BGH 9.10.2014 – III ZR 68/14, NJW 2014, 3580–3582.
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should be regarded as part of the public authority. In model 2, the basic idea is
that outsourcing from a public entity creates a special situation that makes an
analogy from contract law compelling. In model 3, the public authority character
of the task is the central argument for imposing liability. Thus, the public law
nature of the task forms the basis of the argument in all of the models identified
above.
At the same time, the public law nature of the task also complicates the
imposition of vicarious liability. Thus, on a closer look, models 1–3 signify two
inherently different approaches. In models 2 and 3, the public entity becomes
liable towards the citizen for the acts of the private service provider constituting a
breach of the contract with the public entity or a negligent act. Whether or not the
private service has breached the contract or acted negligently will be decided on
the basis of a professional liability standard. Thus, in a way this rather strict
standard is transferred to the public entity, which would otherwise often have
been subject to a milder liability standard. In this manner, imposing vicarious
liability for private actors can indirectly lead to subjecting the public entity to a
stricter liability. Put differently, the strict private actor liability standard is trans-
ferred to the public entity. Conversely, in model 1, the private actor is regarded as
forming part of the public administration. This may lead to a mildening of the
liability of the private actor. Thus, under German law, the private actor is
exempted from liability, unless it has acted with gross negligence or intent. Under
US law, the principle of immunity may in some cases lead to exempting the
private actor entirely from liability. Put differently, features of the milder public
authority liability are transferred to the private actor.
V Conclusion
As described in the introduction to this article, a basic concern with regard to
outsourcing of public services is whether it diminishes accountability. This article
has shown that, with regard to accountability in the shape of liability, contracting
out of welfare services may in fact bring about a ‘liability gap’. Specifically,
contracting out may have as a consequence that the citizen ends up in a less
favourable position than would have been the case had the provision of the
service not been outsourced. This liability gap is only created in some situations.
If the private service provider has simply infringed ordinary behavioural stan-
dards, ordinary tort law rules will apply, most often providing a remedy for the
citizen in tort law as against the private service provider. In contrast, a liability
gap seems to be created if the loss is caused by the private service provider
breaching the contract with the public entity. In these situations, the citizen may
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well have difficulties succeeding with a claim against the private service provider
since there is no contractual relation between the parties and since it will not
always be possible to argue that the breach of the contract also constitutes a tort
towards the citizen. Likewise, as a general rule, the public entity will not be
vicariously liable towards the citizen for the acts of the private service provider
unless specific exceptions apply. In other words, whereas outside the contracting
out situation the citizen would be able to claim damages fromwhomever provided
the service (a private actor or a public entity), contracting out seems to change
this situation and create a situation in which the citizen may be able to sue neither
the private party nor the public entity. This is an unacceptable position.
The problem seems to be surfacing in case law and theory and different
solutions may be under development. One possibility is to seek solutions in
contract law and let citizens sue the private actor on the basis of third party
beneficiary law. However, this would require the parties to the contract to make
rather express provisions for this solution in the contract and incentives will often
be lacking. A better option, therefore, might be for the courts to further develop
the concept of vicarious liability in order to hold the public entity liable for the
acts of the private service provider. There are signs in case law and legal theory
that this approach has been taken. However, it is also not without its complica-
tions. Depending on the choice of model, one may end up imposing a stricter
liability on the public authority or a milder liability on the private actor than
would have been the case outside of the outsourcing situation. In addition, so far
the vicarious liability models that have been under consideration do not seem to
distinguish between situations in which the private service provider has infringed
ordinary behavioural standards (situation A) – where arguably there is a lesser
need for vicarious liability since the private service provider can be held liable –
and the situations in which the loss is caused by a breach of contract by the
private service provider (situation B), creating a liability gap. To the extent that
the concept of vicarious liability is going to be further developed in this area of
the law, it should be considered whether this distinction should be made.
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